Exchange, Private, and Communal Framing of Pensions: Mental Models and Beneficiary Perception Drive Pension Policy Endorsement

Abstract

Manipulating lay-people’s mental models of pension policy shifts their endorsement of the policy, even if the policy itself does not change at all. Two randomized experiments on a fairly representative U.S. sample framed pension policy using an Exchange (reciprocity) model, a Private (responsibility) model, or a Communal (sharing) model. Combined, the experiments show: (1) The perceived warmth, competence, and deservingness of pension beneficiaries can mediate framing effects on policy preference; (2) Mediation exists when policy “has a face” (i.e., stereotypical beneficiaries accompany the elaboration of the mental model); and (3) Communal frames generally raise policy endorsement notably via increased perceived warmth of beneficiaries, Exchange frames dampen endorsement for people low in future-mindedness, and Private frames raise endorsement indirectly (via increased perceived deservingness) but dampen endorsement directly. The studies’ implications are both theoretical and policy-relevant; they document a process of stereotype-mediated policy feedback and suggest how the three frames shift the policy debate on pension reform in aging societies. Filler