Ensuring Saddam’s Final Cry: Lessons Learned from U.S. Policy and Decision-Making in the Wars with Iraq

Abstract

This thesis closely examines the two major U.S. wars in Iraq and, through qualitative analysis, develops policy recommendations for future conflicts of a similar nature. The thesis finds that the policy process behind the first Gulf War worked much more smoothly than the policy process that led to the later Iraq War. Moreover, it makes the case that the difference in quality between the two wars explains many of the outcomes of each. The thesis also goes into depth about the continuity between the two wars and how, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, consistent misunderstanding of the U.S. adversary, Saddam Hussein, led to the Iraq War. The thesis begins by briefly outlining the history of U.S.-Iraqi relations from just before WWI up until the eve of the Gulf Crisis in 1991. The next chapter examines U.S. mistakes made during the Gulf Crisis and War. The following chapter discusses the Iraq War, including explaining its connection to the Gulf War and analyzing flaws in the policy process that led to the failure of the Iraq War. The final chapter of the thesis outlines what lessons the United States can learn from these two wars in order to more effectively achieve U.S. interests in the future. The thesis is not the authoritative source for every mistake the United States made in both wars, but instead serves a starting point for future investigations into the Iraq War. The inclusion of original interviews with senior policy-makers attempts to shed new light onto the subject and revitalize debate. It is only by looking closely at these wars that we can improve the way the United States wages war in the future.