The Flip Side of the COIN: The US Role in Stability Operations

Abstract

This thesis examines a number of post-conflict situations to determine what lessons can be learned on how to approach post-conflict and pre-conflict stability operations for future efforts if, and more likely when, they become necessary. Too often, the United States has failed to capitalize on the lessons learned from its previous stabilization engagements, build on successful practices, or avoid predictable pitfalls. This thesis argues that stability operations are not easy, but they are feasible – and necessary. Stability operations have not been conducted successfully in recent decades due to many failed policies and detrimental decisions. This is not to say that some elements of operations were not successful – there are both positive and negative lessons to be learned from all of these conflicts. By analyzing several case studies in depth, including US efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, I propose a framework for the US government to use in stabilization operations around the world. These principles can be applied in conflicts ranging from conventional wars to humanitarian interventions to post-radical transitions. These lessons stress the need for changes not only in the implementation of US policy, but in the organization of the US government itself. I conclude that an organizational failure in the US government has prevented the successful execution of stability operations and propose recommendations to fix this inadequacy.