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Abstract

How did Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), a national-Catholic party advocating for a welfare state, achieve a landslide victory in 2015, when Poland was in a period of sustained economic growth and declining Church attendance? This thesis posits that PiS’s surprising victory came from both an alliance with the Catholic Church in Poland and because of its authoritarian party structure that allowed it to shift its platform to capture the religious and welfare state vote. Ultimately, PiS’s authoritarian structure and shift in appeals to religion and welfare state policies drove its success, with the Church playing the role of a critical partner in messaging and mobilization. This thesis tests hypotheses regarding the level of political involvement and influence of the Catholic Church, as well as hypotheses about PiS’s shift in platform and authoritarian leadership. It utilizes semi-structured interviews with Polish MPs, quantitative analysis of voting patterns, and document analysis of both Church documents and PiS party platforms. It attempts to contextualize the relationship between PiS and the Catholic Church, also shedding light on the radicalization of both institutions over the years. It traces the levels of political involvement by the Church in Poland over the years and its ability to influence voters. It also analyzes PiS’s internal structure, platform evolution, and Poland’s electoral preferences. The results indicate that voters in a diocese with a conservative bishop are more likely to vote for PiS, that the leadership of the Catholic Church in Poland has become increasingly conservative and willing to enter a coalition with PiS, and that this political involvement began around 2009. In terms of PiS, the results showed that PiS had indeed shifted its platform over the years in order to attract the religious and welfare state voters and that its authoritarian leadership makes it possible to alter its party platform and successfully implement it in the legislature. The findings of this thesis indicate that PiS’s electoral victory came from a mix of changes both within the Church and PiS. The Polish electorate’s preferences remained constant, while the available political options shifted in 2015 to accommodate both religion and the desire for a welfare state. The Church regained its independence to become politically involved again after John Paul II passed away. The Church was catalyzed to use its political influence starting in 2009 after it faced threats of further secularism through EU integration and laws that contradicted its moral teachings. The Church’s leadership became increasingly conservative, particularly with the selection of Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki as President of the Polish Episcopate (KEP), and then entered into an alliance with PiS. When it came to party strategy and evolution, PiS was able to change its platform in order to capture the most significant block of voters in Poland being those who are religious and desire a welfare state. This shift was in the making since 2005 but was lost due to PiS stepping away from its welfare state platform in 2007 and the Catholic Church not becoming politically involved until the 2015 IVF legislative debate. The findings of this thesis can be applied to other countries who have historical legacies of powerful religious institutions or lived under regimes with socialist policies. It demonstrates that even institutions in decline can resurge with the correct alliance. It also shows that religion and populism mix very well since they both fight against the impending liberal threat. It also shows that even 30 years into democracy, the system can unravel with strategic captures of the electorate by an authoritarian party.