Where The Bear Meets the Dragon: China, Russia, and the Struggle for Influence in Central Asia

Abstract

Twenty-eight years after the five republics of Central Asia gained their independence from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation still exerts a great deal of influence over the region, thanks to its enduring security, economic, cultural, and demographic connections to Central Asia. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China has been building increasingly close economic and investment ties with Central Asian nations, and this process has accelerated since the start of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. With the declining involvement of the United States in the region, in part due to its post-2014 drawdown from Afghanistan, Russia and China are currently the two most influential outside powers that have major stakes in Central Asia. Furthermore, given the recent tightening of security and economic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, many analysts have seen a commensurate partnership develop between the two nations with respect to Central Asian policy. This thesis explores the different interests, goals, and objectives of Russia and China in Central Asia as well as their levers of influence in the region and their success in the present and recent past in achieving their regional objectives. Additionally, this thesis evaluates the geopolitical intentions and capabilities of Central Asian nations in order to determine how they will interact in future with the two great powers. Methodologically, I synthesize primary and secondary sources, including scholarly and journalistic articles, reports from think tanks and other outlets, historical texts, books, and personal interviews with academics, experts, and business leaders in the United States, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to analyze the role that Russia and China play in Central Asia. I conclude that the partnership between Russia and China with respect to Central Asia is likely to break down in the near to medium term (i.e., the next several years) into a low-level rivalry, as Russian and Chinese interests and aims in the region will increasingly come into conflict with each other. Namely, China will begin to assert itself in the security realm in Central Asia, alarming Russia, which views Central Asia as a natural part of its sphere of influence. There are already signs of this nascent rivalry, as Russia discreetly seeks to frustrate China’s designs in the region while remaining publicly committed to closer cooperation. I believe that this increased competition between China and Russia in Central Asia, while carrying the potential of adversely affecting the broader relationship between the two powers, will be significantly beneficial for Central Asian nations. Given Russia’s wide array of mechanisms of influence in the region, Russia and China are much more evenly matched than simple comparisons of the two nations’ economic growth and gross domestic products would suggest, and Russia may well have the upper hand in the region for the short to medium term. As such, Central Asian nations are likely to find themselves in an enviable position in which the two great powers are bidding for influence in the region, without the rivalry growing so severe that Central Asians are forced to choose sides. This stands in marked contrast to an alternative scenario in which continued Sino-Russian cooperation would lead to increased dependence and exploitation for Central Asian nations.