FIFA’s Host Country Demands: A Comparative Case Study of Colombia and Mexico for the 1986 World Cup

Abstract

A comparative case study of Mexico versus Colombia was conducted in terms of the host selection process for the 1986 World Cup through detailed research and five interviews of individuals with inside knowledge of the matter at hand. Colombia won the bid to host the 1986 World Cup on June 9th, 1974, but on October 25th, 1982 Colombian President Betancur announced that Colombia would not host the 1986 World Cup. Then on May 20th, 1983 Mexico was awarded the bid by FIFA to host the 1986 World Cup. This is the only instance in which a nation has withdrawn from hosting the World Cup after winning the bid. This thesis analyzes why Colombia initially announced their candidacy for the 1986 World Cup bid and their reason for withdrawal once they won the bid. Colombia argues that their decision was because of FIFA’s excessive demands while FIFA believes that Colombia's financial incapability was the reason for their decision. After conducing extensive research, this thesis finds that both were at fault. Colombia's lack of action from 1974-1982 created pressure for FIFA which in turn creating a list of demands that it knew Colombia could not accept. This thesis also looks into why Mexico decided to host this World Cup instead. Mexico winning the bid to host the 1986 World Cup is analyzed through the lens of the hazard cycle. Through the investigation of why FIFA then picked Mexico to host the 1986 World Cup instead of the United States or Canada, policy conditionality and policy favoritism are shown. It turns out that Mexico did not comply with the same demands that were required of Colombia. FIFA was 5 flexible because its close connection with Guillermo Cañedo, vice president Mexican multi media company Televisa, would allow it to financially benefit greatly from television rights by hosting the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. This policy conditionality and favoritism are then linked to international organizations in general, such as the International Monetary Fund in terms of how greater international organizations negotiate with developing countries. This thesis concludes by showing the momentum that co-hosting World Cups by developing countries has been starting to gain for the 2026 and 2030 World Cups.