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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01hh63sv99j
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dc.contributor.advisorSmith, Michael-
dc.contributor.authorSingh, Keshav-
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-15T15:55:25Z-
dc.date.available2013-07-15T15:55:25Z-
dc.date.created2013-04-01-
dc.date.issued2013-07-15-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01hh63sv99j-
dc.description.abstractThis paper critiques some aspects of T.M. Scanlon’s meta-normative theory. The first chapter examines Scanlon’s metaphysically deflated account of existence and argues that it fails to sufficiently ground normativity. The second chapter examines Scanlon’s analogy between mathematics and normativity and argues that it does not support non-naturalism about normativity.en_US
dc.format.extent44 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleRealist Enough? Not Quite: On the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Reasons Fundamentalismen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2013en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
dc.rights.accessRightsWalk-in Access. This thesis can only be viewed on computer terminals at the <a href=http://mudd.princeton.edu>Mudd Manuscript Library</a>.-
pu.mudd.walkinyes-
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2020

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