Regime Type Effect on Adjudication Outcome at the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body

Abstract

This thesis explores the research question of whether or not a country’s political regime type has an effect on its trade dispute adjudication outcome at the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB). Informed by two theories from existing literature, I hypothesize that regime type indeed has an effect on WTO adjudication outcome with ambiguous expectation of direction. I employ statistical methods to explore the relationship between regime type and adjudication outcome, and find some evidence that authoritarian regimes receive superior ruling outcomes. Through case study and interviews, I find that authoritarian governments have greater autonomy to decide which cases to file and that authoritarian states are as capable of using effective public-private partnership to prepare for WTO litigation as democracies are, if not even more so. These findings confirm and explain the regime type effect found through statistical analysis. This thesis contributes to the understanding of the effect of domestic political institutions on participation in international organizations, and conversely, the effect of involvement in international institutions on transformation of state-business relations