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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01f7623f90n
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dc.contributorHogan, Desmond P.-
dc.contributor.advisorKment, Boris C.-
dc.contributor.authorBell, David-
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-29T15:07:24Z-
dc.date.available2015-06-29T15:07:24Z-
dc.date.created2015-03-30-
dc.date.issued2015-06-29-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01f7623f90n-
dc.description.abstractIn my thesis, I combine Strawson’s defense of the possibility of moral judgements independent of free will, with Frankfurt’s preconditions for being a person, in an attempt to improve upon Strawson’s theory. In doing so, I hope only to offer a slightly more comprehensive account of when it would and would not be appropriate to apply Strawson’s exempting conditions regarding reactive attitudes.en_US
dc.format.extent37 pages*
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleReactive Attitudes and the Possibility of Moral Judgementen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2015en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2020

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