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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cn69m413t
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dc.contributor.authorMaital, Shlomoen_US
dc.contributor.authorBenjamini, Yaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-26T01:43:43Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-26T01:43:43Z-
dc.date.issued1979-11-01T00:00:00Zen_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer 1980en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cn69m413t-
dc.description.abstractBehavior toward uncertain future inflation gives rise to large diffuse externalities which result in market failure and require introduction of legal restraints -- mandatory wage—price controls. Models of wage-profit conflict and consumer vs. consumer rivalry are set out in which individual rationality leads to collective ruin (the so—called Prisoner's Dilemma). Evidence from national sample surveys indicates broad—based support for controls, and suggests some people do perceive the externalities generated by inflation.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 131en_US
dc.titleInflation as Prisoner's Dilemma: The Case for Mandatory Wage-Price Controlsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
pu.projectgrantnumber360-2050en_US
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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