Leveraging Leviathan: Israeli Energy and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean

Abstract

The Eastern Mediterranean has attracted a huge amount of attention as a strategic and political space since the discovery of significant natural gas wealth underneath the seabed in 2009. Still, all attempts to benefit from that wealth by the Sea’s bordering countries have run into serious problems. Political disputes over borders, sovereignty, and exploration rights combine with economic questions about export markets and delivery mechanisms, each with their own technical problems. Even before the natural gas discoveries, the political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean shifted around as the AKP sought to reposition Turkey as a regional power and leader of the Islamic world. Cracks appeared in the strategic partnership with Israel that compounded with each additional burst of violence in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict. Greece and Cyprus, each with their own long-standing disputes with Turkey, seized the chance to build connections with Israel. Just as the Israel- Turkey relationship snapped in the Gaza Flotilla Raid in May 2010, Israel was uncovering the extent of its natural gas wealth not just in the Tamar Field found in January 2009, but also the Leviathan Field, discovered in December 2010. Israel and Cyprus defined their joint Exclusive Economic Zone borders that same month. Without Turkey as a partner, Israel turned to Greece for joint training exercises on the water and in the air. Defending the offshore platforms and future pipelines required tighter coordination with Cyprus as well. Despite attempts to avoid painting a picture of an anti-Turkey alliance, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus triangle took an anti- Turkish bent thanks to Turkey’s repeated use of naval force to blockade hydrocarbon exploration by Cypriot-contracted ships. Meanwhile, Israel needed a way to export a large portion of its natural gas. Egypt, originally viewed as a promising market for Israeli sales, discovered their own massive Zohr field in August 2015. Private companies proposed plans for a pipeline to Turkey, but politics kept them grounded. While Israel and Turkey officially reconciled in July 2016, the relationship remains weak to turbulence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Turkish activity in contested waters with Cyprus, with whom Israel continues to cooperate. Egypt’s two liquefaction terminals sit unused as the domestic gas market outstrips Egyptian production, so many industry insiders support Israeli and Cypriot plans to export their gas as LNG and save the cost building pipes to Europe. The EU is pulling for an ambitious pipeline from the Israeli and Cypriot fields to Cyprus, Greece, and Italy that could get the final greenlight within the year.