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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01c247dv83j
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dc.contributor.advisorFickenscher, Jon-
dc.contributor.advisorGul, Faruk-
dc.contributor.authorSpady, Rachel-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T19:13:03Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T19:13:03Z-
dc.date.created2018-05-07-
dc.date.issued2018-08-17-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01c247dv83j-
dc.description.abstractWithin this paper, I will discuss the notion of bargaining with multiple intermediaries.I will be using the notion that the bargaining power of a firm is derived from its ability to be a tough bargainer, or to make take it or leave it offers. This notion was first introduced by Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio. [2] I expand upon their model, by extending it from only taking into account two toughnesses to an n-toughness type model. We find similar results in this expansion, seeing that agents with a higher bargaining power are able to act as intermediaries in the model, and to rent seek in interactions with weaker agents.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleTake It or Leave It: Intermediation and Rent-seeking As Determined by Agents’ Toughnessesen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2018en_US
pu.departmentMathematicsen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
pu.contributor.authorid960800828-
Appears in Collections:Mathematics, 1934-2020

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