The Subnational Effects of Money in Politics

Abstract

There has been a wealth of scholarly inquiry into the effect of money on the influencing of political outcomes. Most scholarship exhibits a decidedly macrofocused character, analyzing the interplay of money, influence and political outcomes at the federal level. This thesis focuses on institutional changes in both the legislature and judiciary concerning campaign finance and their collective effect on micro-level political outcomes, identifying three key arenas of subnational politics: State Supreme Court elections, local school board elections, and municipal fiscal policy agendas. With respect to elections in both State Supreme Courts, this thesis analyzes the effect of contributions and expenditures on the likelihood of electoral success and the garnering of individual votes and finds that, while money does not guarantee electoral success, it is attributed to an increased percentage in votes obtained by candidates. With respect to municipal fiscal policy, this thesis attempts to capture the indirect effect of lobbying and political pressure by moneyed interests using the number of business and professional associations within a municipality as a proxy for the level of corporate activism therein. Testing the likelihood of corporate activism to affect the fiscal agenda of various municipalities, this thesis finds that spending on various categories is statistically correlated with the particular preferences of business and professional interests for those particular fiscal choices. Ultimately, these series of findings contribute to a growing body of work that brings much-needed civic and academic focus to the effect of the new paradigm of money in politics on the most intimate areas of American government.