Rationality, Bias, and Mind: Essays on Epistemology and Cognitive Science

Abstract

In these essays, I offer solutions to a cluster of issues in epistemology, the philosophy of

mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science. These issues center around the rational

evaluability (and rational evaluation) of mental states found in human beings. Which kinds of

mental states can be rationally evaluated? In virtue of what can they be so evaluated? And what

role do facts about our cognitive limitations and biases play in rational evaluation? I offer

answers to these questions in what follows.

The first two chapters concern a particular kind of mental state, the implicit aitude.

Implicit aitudes are opaque mental states that we often lack conscious access to, but that

influence our behaviors in many ways. In Chapter 1, I argue that implicit aitudes, like beliefs,

credences, and intentions (and unlike associations or mere flights of fancy) can be rationally

evaluated. I argue this is because they have a capacity to respond to evidence. In Chapter 2, I

show that the implicit aitudes are best thought of as belonging to a familiar psychological

kind: belief. Our implicit beliefs form a significant portion of our rational outlook, although we

often remain alienated from their contents and functions. Coming to terms with these facts is of

the utmost importance for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

In Chapter 3, I turn my aention to the rationality of psychological biases more

generally. I consider so-called biases of reasoning, often known as heuristics, and ask about their

rational standing. I argue that utilizing heuristic reasoning strategies often represents the best

we can do from the point of view of rationality. Heuristic reasoning represents a local rational

maximum, producing more accurate conclusions in our reasoning than our aempts to

implement more “ideal” reasoning rules. I discuss three components of the human heuristic

reasoning strategy (aributive substitution, recognition, and one-reason reasoning), and show

how their use can lead to accurate conclusions in information-rich environments.