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dc.contributor.advisorChristensen, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.advisorFriedberg, Aaronen_US
dc.contributor.authorMastro, Oriana Skylaren_US
dc.contributor.otherPolitics Departmenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-16T17:26:42Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-16T05:10:05Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp017s75dc49z-
dc.description.abstractWhen will states talk while fighting and when will they evade wartime negotiations? What explains stretches during wars in which there is fighting without talking? The current international relations literature focuses on the causes of war, the durability of post-conflict agreements, and when talks lead to the termination of the war. However, the field ignores a question central to the resolution of limited wars: at what point do leaders finally agree to launch talks during the course of the war? Because the theoretical literature largely assumes that talk is cheap, conflict analyses have failed to explain decisions regarding whether to open talks with the enemy, an obvious precursor for a peace agreement. This dissertation evaluates the Vietnam War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Korean War - using interviews and primary and secondary sources - to better analyze how information from the battlefield and the bargaining table interact to shape leaders' decisions about peace talks. I present a `ratchet effect' model to explain the variation in countries' positions on wartime negotiations. I argue that states fear that a willingness to talk will communicate weakness to their opponents. Their opponents in turn could be encouraged to escalate to a level that is unsustainable or unfavorable to them. The risk of this dynamic explains the long periods of fighting in which there are no direct talks and offers to talk are not taken seriously by either side. However, not all countries perceive this risk equally. The state with less room to escalate is acutely concerned about the ratchet effect and will therefore set strict preconditions on talking and rarely, if at all, make offers to talk. The country with more room to escalate offers talks but refuses to concede to any preconditions because it is confident in its ability to achieve its goals militarily. Only when the incentive to escalate has been adequately reduced by the mounting costs of war will leaders be willing to relax their positions on preconditions to allow for the emergence of peace talks.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPrinceton, NJ : Princeton Universityen_US
dc.relation.isformatofThe Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the <a href=http://catalog.princeton.edu> library's main catalog </a>en_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectChinese foreign policyen_US
dc.subjectKorean Waren_US
dc.subjectUS foreign policyen_US
dc.subjectVietnam Waren_US
dc.subjectWar terminationen_US
dc.subject.classificationPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.classificationInternational relationsen_US
dc.subject.classificationAsian studiesen_US
dc.titleSettling the Score: The Interactive Effect of Talking and Fighting on War Duration and Terminationen_US
dc.typeAcademic dissertations (Ph.D.)en_US
pu.projectgrantnumber690-2143en_US
pu.embargo.terms2015-09-16en_US
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