LEGACIES OF REVOLUTION: Sources of Durability for the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abstract

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), defying politicians’ and pundits’ almost annual predictions for regime collapse. Since its inception in the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy, the IRI regime has survived a plethora of internal and external challenges. This raises the question: what accounts for the durability of the IRI regime over the past forty years? To answer this question, this thesis has employed Levistky and Way’s theory on the Durability of Revolutionary Regimes. Levistky and Way state that revolutions produce four legacies that lead to durable authoritarian rule: 1) the destruction of independent power centers; 2) cohesive ruling parties; 3) tight partisan control over the security forces; and 4) powerful coercive apparatuses. The function of these legacies is to help inoculate the regime from mass protests, elite defection and military coups – three major sources of authoritarian collapse. This thesis has examined whether and how the IRI regime has fulfilled these legacies. It made use of a wide range of primary and academic sources, including historical data, government documents, the memoirs and statements of IRI officials, archived newspapers, an interview with the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran, political science essays, and Persian-language sources. It found that the IRI has achieved the first and fourth legacies of durability; its divided opposition and its coercive apparatus, with the willingness and capacity to repress, have protected the regime from overthrow by mass protests. However, the factionalism that permeated the IRI’s elite and Revolutionary Guard armed force complicated its fulfillment of the middle two legacies. The IRI developed distinct mechanisms for fulfilling the functions of these two legacies. The thesis traces the IRI’s distinction in fulfilling these revolutionary legacies of durability to its distinct revolutionary origins. In the process, it demonstrates how the IRI’s present system of factionalism and parallel institutions came about, revealing the importance of revolutionary context in shaping the regime we know today. Nonetheless, the IRI’s distinct mechanisms are highly dependent on a politically deft Supreme Leader, able to balance rival institutions and factions. Moreover, the IRI’s parallel institutions and factionalism, while able to be managed in ways that serve the regime, are economically inefficient for national interest and unsustainable. Hence, Supreme Leader succession and economic growth will be the main policy challenges for the IRI regime moving forward.