The Effect of International Aid on the Fragmentation of the Syrian Opposition

Abstract

The Syrian opposition’s fragmentation is the greatest challenge faced by the search for an alternative to Bashar Assad. There are thousands of distinct armed opposition groups. While these groups cooperate in offensives against the regime, they lose both energy and time in the widespread infighting between opposition groups. Attempts at unifying these bodies, whether it be politically, such as through the Syrian National Council, or militarily through various umbrellas such as the Islamic Front, have not lasted. Ceasefire negotiations have failed repeatedly, as the opposition has not been able to articulate a unified set of terms to bring to the table. This paper investigates the impact of international aid on the fragmentation of both the Syrian political and military opposition. Third-party international actors including the United States, Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey, and Jordan have become heavily embroiled in the opposition, funneling huge sums of money, non-lethal aid, and arms to support both the political and armed opposition. Each intervening country possesses a unique set of priorities and incentives. Countries cherry-pick opposition groups to support based on their unique priorities. Thus, the distribution of international aid is catered towards the interests of intervening countries rather than the unification or needs of the Syrian opposition. The paper analyzes the impact of international intervention into the political opposition. It concludes that the divergent agendas of individual countries crippled the political opposition, by robbing it of social and economic endowments. The paper then moves into an analysis of the impact of international aid on the fragmentation of the armed opposition. The analysis of opposition infighting implies that international aid directed towards non-dominant powerbrokers and non-powerbrokers increased the fragmentation of the Syrian opposition. The paper introduces a new conceptualization of how international aid impacts the power distribution between opposition groups. Unlike previous scholarly work, the paper postulates that the new power distributionis determined both by the economic aid received as well as the ability of the specific group to convert this aid into power. Giving aid to groups with less ability to convert materials into power may have incentivized rebel infighting as other groups attempted to seize the new aid. The paper also concludes that aid directed at dominant power-brokers does not necessarily increase opposition fragmentation. Lastly, the paper finds that areas of conflicting international interests results in increased opposition fragmentation, as exemplified by the conflict between Operation Euphrates Shield and the Syrian Democratic Forces. These findings point to a need to restrategize future international aid to civil wars.The paper concludes with two main policy recommendations for the United States: firstly, to dedicate more resources to support the growth of social resources through supporting civilian activism; and secondly, to desist in funding non-dominant powerbrokers.