A Unified Peninsula: Consensus as the Optimal Path to Korean Reunification

Abstract

Despite both North and South Korea expressing their desires for a unified peninsula, the history of inter – Korean relations has been a tumultuous road characterized by progression followed by regression and rising tensions. Contending political ideologies between liberal and conservative South Korean presidencies manifest in diverging reunification policies. This has further complicated the goal of a united Korea as there is a lack of consensus within South Korean politics on what reunification scenario is most likely to induce peaceful and prosperous reunification. While popular sentiment indicates reunification by consensus (agreement between North and South Korea) is the most desirable scenario, many experts believe reunification by absorption (North Korean regime failure) is the most likely outcome to induce a unified peninsula. These two scenarios come in contention with each other as the policies necessary to induce the corresponding outcome require diverging policies from the South Korean government. This thesis seeks to determine which scenario, reunification by consensus or reunification by absorption, is more feasible and desirable for South Korea. To determine this, it focuses on four distinct analyses pertaining to policy components essential to a peaceful and prosperous reunification. The analyses are as follows: a historical analysis of reunification policies on the Korean peninsula through the lens of the Five Korean Summits, a case study on German unification, the relationship between economic development and democratization, and the relationship North Korea holds with nuclear weaponry. Using the lessons learned from these chapters, this thesis determines that reunification by consensus is both the most feasible and desirable scenario for the South Korean government due its comparative advantages in cost, reduction of military tensions, and the creation of a stronger economic foundation for a more prosperous, united Korea. Ultimately, this thesis makes three policy recommendations for future South Korean engagement policies: 1) economic exchange must come first and be excluded from denuclearization discussions, 2) an incremental, step-based approach, with incentives to induce engagement, penalties to disincentivize regression and clear timetables, is the most optimal way to induce denuclearization, and 3) a reunification fund is necessary to support the immense cost of reunification regardless of method.