Between Virtue & Temptation: Self-Control, Action, & Practical Thought in Aristotle's Ethics

Abstract

In contrast to his conceptions of virtuous and akratic character types, Aristotle’s

conception of self-control (enkrateia) has received comparatively little attention. This is

surprising, given the close similarities between self-control and character virtue.

Crucially, both virtuous and enkratic people are guided in action by true practical

judgments, which suggests that they both do the right thing for the right reasons. This, in

turn, challenges the unique and central role that virtue, in contrast to self-control, plays in

the account of excellent action and practical thought found in the Nicomachean Ethics

(NE). I develop an account of enkratic action and practical thought, on the basis of

relevant texts from NE I-IV, VI-VII, and De Anima III.9-11. I argue that the bad

appetitive reactions of enkratic people bring with them intruding impressions -- false

rational appearances of bad objects as good-- that impede their practical thought both in

deliberation and in the performance of particular actions. Since enkratic people must

overcome these intruding impressions, their recognition of the practical reason for a

given action does not suffice to lead them to action; they must make the additional step of

rejecting the bad alternative. In this way, unlike virtuous people, their actions fail to be

guided fully by the practical reasons alone.