Syria's Path to Peace: An Analysis of the Vienna, Geneva and Astana Peace Processes, and Subsequent Policy Recommendations

Abstract

Beginning in 2011, the Syrian civil war is a result of decades of frustration with the Assad government and the political and military institutions that guarantee its power. This thesis begins by providing the historical context for Syria's political structure and the factors that led to the uprising in 2011. It then outlines the key internal and external actors that support or oppose the Assad regime. The challenge of resolving the conflict lies in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement amongst the key parties involved. This thesis then investigates the peace processes from 2012-2017 that have attempted to resolve this conflict. It examines the successes and failures of the Vienna, Geneva, and Astana peace talks, and extracts lessons that can be learned from the diplomatic strategies pursued. Accordingly, the Vienna peace talks produced the Vienna Statements and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (UNSCR 2254). Despite the agreement of these documents, the Vienna peace talks were unsuccessful for the following reasons: neither the Syrian government nor the opposition was represented at the talks; the parties that were present could not agree on Assad's fate and could not outline what a political transition in Syria would look like; and finally, the timing of negotiations was not ripe for the objectives in the Vienna Statements and UNSCR 2254 to be realized. The Geneva peace talks focused on attaining a political solution to the conflict. While the Geneva peace talks produced the Geneva Communiqué (2012) agreement, the talks were unsuccessful for the following reasons: each actor did not clearly define its objectives; key stakeholders were not included at each stage of the discussions; and no accountability mechanisms were agreed upon to ensure parties upheld their agreements. Also, the talks highlighted the importance of a political transition coexisting with a ceasefire. Finally, the Astana peace talks prioritized establishing a nationwide ceasefire in Syria. Despite the Memorandum on the Creation of De-escalation Areas in the Syrian Arab Republic accord, each side accused the other of violating the agreement. Ultimately the Astana peace talks demonstrated Russia's power in influencing the outcomes of the discussions, and the United States' disengagement throughout the process. The talks also underlined the importance of having a United Nations mediator facilitate the peace process. While the Vienna, Geneva and Astana peace processes have been unsuccessful in resolving the Syrian civil war, it is, nonetheless, important to examine the lessons learned from each set of discussions, in order to offer relevant policy recommendations. This thesis, therefore, concludes by offering a set of recommendations to advance the prospect for peace in Syria. These recommendations encourage the United States to do the following: withdraw its military presence in Syria; strengthen its diplomatic ties with its Middle Eastern allies in order to effectively endorse Geneva as the only legitimate peace process for Syria; and both abandon the policy that "Assad must go," and convince the international community that it should do the same. Finally, this thesis emphasizes that multilateral cooperation between the United States and its allies is essential in advancing the Geneva peace process. The Syrian civil war continues to cause an immense amount of suffering for innocent civilians, and the only way to resolve the conflict is for the key actors to fully commit to the diplomatic process.