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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp012z10ws54r
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dc.contributorFara, Delia G.-
dc.contributor.advisorKment, Boris C.-
dc.contributor.authorRobbins, Brennan Nicholas-
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-29T14:46:13Z-
dc.date.available2015-06-29T14:46:13Z-
dc.date.created2015-03-30-
dc.date.issued2015-06-29-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp012z10ws54r-
dc.description.abstractIn “A Probabilistic Approach to the Surprise Examination Problem,” I use basic facts about probability and credence functions to reconstruct a famous argument for a purported paradox: a student should not believe a professor’s decree that there will be a surprise examination. I provide four reasons to suggest that the reconstructed argument is flawed, most notably that it is self-undermining.en_US
dc.format.extent44 pages*
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleA PROBABILISTIC APPROACH TO THE SURPRISE EXAMINATION PROBLEMen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2015en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2020

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