Age of Digitization: Chasing Judicial Transparency in 21st Century China

Abstract

In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of the People’s Republic of China issued an order directing provinces to release all court judgements on a centralized website, China Judgements Online. However, an examination of court statistics points to a wide interprovincial variation between the number of actual court cases and the number of court judgements published. This thesis asks the question: what explains variation in judicial transparency in China?

To answer this question, I test three key hypotheses on drivers of transparency: returnee-driven transparency, fiscally-driven transparency, and politically-driven transparency. The first contends that provinces with provincial leaders educated in the west will have higher rates of judicial transparency. The second argues that provinces that spend more on courts will have higher judicial transparency. The third holds that provinces with less politically-sensitive events will have higher judicial transparency. Following quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find varying support for each of these three hypotheses.

I begin with quantitative analysis. First, I find minimal, inconclusive support for returnee-driven transparency and, as a result, do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect at standard levels. Future testing on this issue is encouraged, as it may render different results with the availability of more comprehensive datasets. Second, I find strong support against fiscally-driven transparency, instead finding statistically significant evidence that provinces spending more per capita perform worse on the judicial transparency index. Last, I find strong support for politically driven transparency.

Interview evidence presents mixed support for returnee-driven transparency and politically-driven transparency. It offers strong support for fiscally-driven transparency, contrary to my quantitative analysis, and also consistently supports the notion of level-driven transparency, which is not quantitatively tested.

These results contribute to our understanding of Chinese politics in three important ways. First, they suggest that it may be wise to revisit the idea, especially with respect to China, that abroad experiences influence the thinking and policymaking of political leaders. Second, they indicate that there exist both consultative and repressive sides to the Chinese government, which are adjusted at local levels depending on provincial conditions. Third, they establish that external presentation and internal execution of policies promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can differ: initiatives announced by the central government are not necessarily seamlessly followed by local implementation.

The thesis concludes with policy implications and considerations for future research in a new area of scholarship that is exciting, due to its vast potential for exploration. As China continues on the path of judicial transparency, it will be worthwhile and necessary to pursue further examination to elucidate future variations in judicial transparency in China.