Negotiating with Terrorist Organizations: A Study on How Time Influences Government Decisions

Abstract

How does time affect a government’s decision to negotiate with terrorist groups? The goal of this thesis is to elucidate how time, among other factors such as the level of violence and the level of political activity affects governments decisions to negotiate with terrorists. This is an interesting question because many governments publicly refuse to negotiate with terrorists. Terrorist organizations kill thousands of people each year, so why should governments negotiate with them? This paper will argue that governments can and should negotiate with terrorists given the correct circumstances as a way to increase the chances of ending an insurgency. Throughout history, the world has seen cases of prisoner exchanges and ransom payments to terrorist organizations, but full-scale solutions and peace agreements are rare. In order to explore these issues, I examine and compare three non-ideological ethno-nationalist seeking groups: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, and the Turkestan Islamic Party in the Xinjiang province of northwestern China. By investigating their historical contexts, campaign timelines, political activity, and level of violence, we can discover how time affected the governments decisions to negotiate or not. Using a qualitative, comparative case study methodology, I am able to compare and contrast cases that have many similar circumstances but vary in their levels of violence and political activity. For this thesis, I offer a hypothesis for governments dealing with separatist terrorist campaigns. My hypothesis is: governments are more willing and will have a higher probability of negotiating with terrorists involved in long-term conflicts that have large casualty counts and provoke a high level of political activity. The policy implications of negotiating with terrorists concern many countries that are actively fighting terrorist organizations seeking to create their own state. A few conclusions have come from these case studies between separatist groups. Generally, terrorist organizations that are separatist in nature, who display higher levels of political activity and have higher death tolls, have a higher probability of negotiating with governments than groups with a lower level of political activity and a lower death toll. Governments will negotiate from stances of power because doing otherwise would decrease their legitimacy and their prospects of success. Finally, governments should not be afraid of using negotiations as part of their arsenal for fighting against insurgencies and terrorists.