Military Power and Democratization

Abstract

This dissertation examines how variation in the power, structure, and behavior of militaries affects the survival of autocratic regimes and a country's prospects for a transition to democracy. Overall, it shows that military power hinders democratization in three key ways. First, strong militaries -- particularly well-funded ground forces -- buffet autocratic regimes from the pressures of democratic diffusion, particularly after the Cold War. Second, analysis of an original cross-national dataset of all major nonviolent and violent campaigns from 1946 to 2013 demonstrates that democratic revolutions are less likely to emerge or succeed against authoritarian regimes armed with large, well-funded ground forces. Third, analysis of an original cross-national dataset of regime change and leader reshuffling coup attempts under authoritarian regimes over the 1946 to 2015 period reveals that only some kinds of coup attempts -- particularly those that succeed in ousting entrenched personalist dictatorships -- promote democratic transitions. Well-funded militaries are less likely to attempt or succeed in such regime change coups. Military power, in short, hinders democratization via democratic diffusion, democratic revolutions, and democratic coups.