The Politics of Influence in International Economic Cooperation

Abstract

This dissertation studies sources of influence in international economic cooperation. Who shapes the terms of cooperation and why? What confers advantage on some actors over others in achieving favorable cooperative outcomes? What is the role of technocratic knowledge in bargaining over policies and in their implementation? I address these questions by considering in turn the preferences of societal interest groups, the dynamics of bargaining between states, and the role of international organizations in implementing economic cooperation. Chapter 1 explores how intra-industry competition among firms generates support for measures that at face value seem to undermine firm profitability. I develop these arguments in the context of global climate change where policies to mitigate carbon emissions entail significant economic costs, but where nonetheless a growing number of firms lobby actively in favor of regulation and international cooperation. Chapter 2 considers the role of learning and expertise in shaping the dynamics of inter-state bargaining. In many settings learning and the cultivation of technocratic knowledge cannot be meaningfully separated from states' pursuit of their own self-interest. I explore how this impacts the strategic behavior of states in the context of accession negotiations within the World Trade Organization. Chapter 3 (co-authored with Diana Stanescu) considers the role of individual bureaucratic actors in shaping the implementation of cooperative policies in the context of the International Monetary Fund. We analyze the impact of senior staff appointments on financial market assessments of sovereign risk, providing evidence that senior staff members have considerable impact on Fund lending decisions.